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1 
DIRT LAWYERS AND DIRTY REMICS: A DEBATE 
 
In mid-2013, Professors Bradley T. Borden and David J. Reiss published an article in the 
American Bar Association’s Probate & Property journal (May/June 2013, at 13), about the 
disconnect between the securitization process and the mechanics of mortgage assignments.  The 
Borden/Reiss article discussed potential legal and tax issues caused by sloppiness in mortgage 
assignments. 
 
Joshua Stein responded to the Borden/Reiss article, arguing that the technicalities of mortgage 
assignments serve no real purpose and should be eliminated.  That article appeared in the 
November/December 2013 issue of the same publication, at 6. 
 
Stein’s response was accompanied by a commentary from Professors Borden and Reiss, which 
also appeared in the November/December 2013 issue, at 8. 
 
To follow the Borden/Reiss/Stein debate, click on the links in the left margin or on any 
paragraph in the summary above. 
 
For more information on the three authors, including contact information, click on these links: 
 
 Professor Bradley T. Borden 
 Professor David J. Reiss 
 Joshua Stein 
For more information on ABA’s Probate & Property Journal, click here.
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By Bradley T. Borden 
and David J. Reiss
Bradley T. Borden and David J. Reiss are 
professors at Brooklyn Law School.
The day-to-day practice of real estate law typically does not touch on the intricacies of the 
securitization of mortgages, let alone 
the tax laws that apply to mortgage-
backed securities. And that is okay. 
What is not okay is that when struc-
turing mortgaged-backed securities, 
securitization professionals did not 
account for the day-to-day practices 
of lawyers as they relate to the trans-
fer and assignment of mortgage notes 
and mortgages. This disregard may 
result in severe consequences for 
investors, underwriters, and securiti-
zation professionals.
Of equal gravity is the responsibil-
ity to help shape policy that this state 
of affairs imposes on “dirt,” or real 
estate, lawyers, as members of soci-
ety with specialized knowledge. As 
the business cycle turns and the mort-
gage markets rise from the depths of 
the bust, dirt lawyers should be sure 
to make their views known about the 
role law should play in the business 
of real estate finance. In particular, 
they should make clear, first, how 
formalistic legal rules protect the 
parties to a real estate finance trans-
action and, second, that these rules 
should be treated with appropriate 
deference. That formality can protect 
the borrower from paying the debt 
more than once or to the wrong party. 
It also can protect the owner of the 
note from disputes over whether the 
underlying debt should be paid.
Take, for example, the negotiability 
of mortgage notes, which is governed 
by the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC). Notes can be sold by the thou-
sands in run of the mill secondary 
market transactions. Lenders much 
prefer negotiable notes to nonnegotia-
ble ones, so lenders are incentivized 
to properly negotiate them. Trusts 
are bulk purchasers of negotiable 
instruments, which put the “secu-
rity” in a mortgage-backed security 
(MBS). These trusts are best protected 
if they are holders in due course of 
the negotiable instruments and thus 
are incentivized to ensure that the 
notes were properly negotiated. The 
rules of negotiability are quite clear 
and designed for a broad swath of 
the commercial world. Negotiation 
of a typical mortgage note requires 
delivery and the payee’s signature or 
endorsement. Notwithstanding these 
incentives and clear rules, a mountain 
of recently revealed evidence indi-
cates that many notes in secondary 
market transactions were not prop-
erly negotiated.
One of the consequences of the 
sale of a negotiable note not carried 
out in accordance with the require-
ments of the holder in due course 
doctrine is that the purchaser of the 
note may not be free of the personal 
defenses that the note maker (the 
borrower) would have had against 
the original lender. These personal 
defenses include lack of consid-
eration, nonperformance, actual 
payment of the debt, and fraud in 
the inducement. See UCC § 3-302. 
Another consequence of the sale of 
a note not done properly is that the 
beneficial owner (as opposed to the 
legal owner) may not be able to col-
lect on the debt if the borrower is 
in default. And a third—and until 
recently hidden—consequence of an 
improper sale of a note to a second-
ary market participant is that the 
purchaser may fail to comply with 
the requirements necessary to obtain 
favorable tax treatment as a Real 
Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit 
(REMIC).
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This article builds on earlier dis-
cussions of these issues by the 
authors. See Bradley T. Borden & 
David J. Reiss, Wall Street Rules 
Applied to REMIC Classification, Thom-
son Reuters News & Insight (Sept. 13, 
2012), available at http://newsandin 
sight.thomsonreuters.com/Securi 
ties/Insight/2012/09_-_September/
Wall_Street_Rules_Applied_to_
REMIC_Classification, and Bradley 
T. Borden & David J. Reiss, Once a 
Failed REMIC, Never a REMIC, 30 
Cayman Fin. Rev. 65 (1st Quarter 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2185420.
Modern Residential 
 Real Estate Finance
Before 1986, MBSs had various 
tax-related inefficiencies. Most 
importantly, these securities were 
taxable at the entity level, so inves-
tors faced double taxation. Wall 
Street firms successfully lobbied 
Congress to eliminate double taxa-
tion in 1986. This legislation created 
the REMIC, which is not taxed at the 
entity level. This one change auto-
matically boosted REMIC yields over 
other forms of MBSs that would still 
be taxed. Unsurprisingly, REMICs 
larglely displaced these other types of 
MBSs and soon became the dominant 
choice of entity for such transactions.
A REMIC allows for the pooling 
of mortgage loans that can then be 
issued as multiple-tranche MBSs. A 
REMIC is intended to be a passive 
investment in a static pool of mort-
gages. Because of its passive nature, a 
REMIC is limited on how and when it 
can acquire mortgages. In most cases, 
a REMIC must acquire its mortgages 
within three months of its start-up. 
IRC § 860G(a)(3)(ii), (9). The IRC con-
tains draconian penalties for REMICs 
that fail to comply with applica-
ble legal requirements, the “REMIC 
rules.”
In the 1990s, the housing finance 
industry, still faced with the patch-
work of state and local laws relating 
to real estate, sought to streamline the 
process of assigning mortgages from 
the loan originator to a mortgage 
pool. Industry players, including 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 
Mortgage Bankers Association, advo-
cated for the Mortgage Electronic 
Recording System (MERS), which 
was up and running by the end of the 
decade. A MERS mortgage contains 
a statement that “MERS is a sepa-
rate corporation that is acting solely 
as nominee for the Lender and Lend-
er’s successors and assigns. MERS 
claims to be the mortgagee under 
this Security Instrument.” MERS is 
not, however, named on any note 
endorsement. This new system saved 
lenders small, but not insignificant, 
amounts of money in recording fees 
and administrative costs every time a 
mortgage was transferred. The legal 
status of this private recording sys-
tem was not clear, and it had not been 
ratified by Congress. Notwithstand-
ing that fact, nearly all of the major 
mortgage originators participated in 
MERS, and it registered millions of 
mortgages within a couple of years. 
By 2009, MERS claimed to be the 
nominal mortgagee on approximately 
two-thirds of all newly originated res-
idential loans.
Beginning in the early 2000s, 
MERS and other parties in the mort-
gage securitization industry began 
to relax many of the procedures and 
practices they had originally used 
to assign mortgages among indus-
try players. Litigation documents 
and decided cases reveal how relaxed 
the procedures and practices became. 
Hitting a crescendo right before the 
global financial crisis, loan origi-
nation and securitization practices 
became egregiously negligent.
The Rule of Law in the 
Business of Real Estate
Even though some securitizers may 
have complied with all of the terms 
contained in the applicable Pool-
ing and Servicing Agreements that 
govern REMIC MBSs, the very low 
tolerance for deviation in the REMIC 
rules suggests that even a small 
degree of noncompliance could result 
in a finding that individual REMICs 
have violated the strict requirements 
of the IRC. This would cause those 
REMICs to lose their preferred tax 
status. Surprisingly, however, the IRS 
appears to be unresponsive to this 
issue so far, and this failure probably 
contributed to the financial crisis to 
some extent. See Bradley T. Borden, 
Did the IRS Cause the Financial Crisis?, 
Huffington Post, Oct. 18, 2012, avail-
able at www.huffingtonpost.com/
bradley-t-borden/did-the-irs-cause-
the-fin_b_1972207.html.
To obtain the REMIC classification, 
a trust must satisfy several require-
ments. Of particular interest is the 
requirement that within three months 
after the trust’s start-up date substan-
tially all of its assets must be qualified 
mortgages. See IRC § 860D(a)(4). The 
regulations provide that substantially 
all of the assets of a trust are quali-
fied mortgages if no more than a de 
minimis amount of the trust’s assets 
are not qualified mortgages. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(3)(i). A “quali-
fied mortgage” is an obligation that 
is principally secured by an interest 
in real property. See IRC § 860G(a)(3)
(A). Thus, to be a qualified mortgage, 
an asset must satisfy both a tim-
ing requirement (be acquired within 
three months after the start-up date) 
and a definitional requirement (be an 
obligation principally secured by an 
interest in real property).
Industry practices raise ques-
tions about whether trusts satisfied 
either the timing requirement or 
the definitional requirement. The 
Before 1986, 
mortgage-backed securities 
had various tax-related 
inefficiencies.
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general practice was for trusts and 
loan originators to enter into Pool-
ing and Servicing Agreements, which 
required the originator to transfer the 
mortgage note and mortgage to the 
trust. Nonetheless, reports and court 
documents indicate that originators 
and trusts frequently did not com-
ply with the terms of the Pooling and 
Servicing Agreements, and origina-
tors often retained possession of the 
mortgage notes as MERS became the 
nominee of record on the mortgage.
The failure to properly transfer 
the mortgage note and mortgage 
can cause a trust to fail both the 
timing requirement and the defini-
tional requirement that are necessary 
to qualify for REMIC status. The 
trust fails the timing requirement 
because it does not acquire the requi-
site interests within the three-month 
prescribed time frame. It fails the def-
inition requirement because it does 
not legally own the proper obliga-
tions, and what the trust does legally 
own does not appear to be secured by 
interests in real property.
Wall Street Rules or 
Legal Rules?
Although Wall Street treated the 
REMIC rules with disregard, they are 
actually pretty straightforward in 
broad outline. Federal tax law does 
not rely on the state-law definition of 
ownership, but it looks to state law 
to determine parties’ rights, obliga-
tions, and interests in property. See, 
e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 
110 (1932). The tax definition of own-
ership would apply to the mortgage 
notes. See Bradley T. Borden & David 
J. Reiss, Beneficial Ownership and the 
REMIC Classification Rules, 28 Tax 
Mgmt. Real Est. J. 274 (Nov. 7, 2012). 
Tax law also can disregard the trans-
fer (or lack of transfer) of formal title 
when the transferor retains many of 
the benefits and burdens of owner-
ship. See Bailey v. Commissioner, 912 
F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1990).
Courts focus on whether the ben-
efits and burdens of ownership pass 
from one party to another when con-
sidering who the owner of property 
is for tax purposes. Grodt & McKay 
Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 
1221, 1237 (1981). The analysis of 
ownership does not merely look to 
the agreements the parties entered 
into because the label parties give 
to a transaction does not determine 
its character. See Helvering v. F. & R. 
Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939). 
The analysis must examine the under-
lying economics and the attendant 
facts and circumstances to determine 
who owns the mortgage notes for tax 
purposes. See id. Thus, even if a trust 
owns a mortgage under Article 9 of 
the UCC, it would not appear to be 
the tax owner. 
Courts in many states have consid-
ered the legal rights and obligations 
of REMICs with respect to mort-
gage notes and mortgages that the 
REMICs claim to own. Courts are 
split, with some ruling in favor of 
MERS as nominee for the REMIC and 
others ruling in favor of other par-
ties whose interests are adverse to the 
REMIC and to MERS. Apparently no 
court has considered how significant 
these rules are for the REMIC classi-
fication for tax purposes. Standing to 
foreclose and participate in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding will likely affect 
the tax analysis of whether REMIC 
trust assets are secured by an interest 
in real property, but they probably do 
not affect the tax analysis of whether 
REMIC trusts own obligations. (The 
lack of standing should result in a 
finding that the mortgage note is not 
secured by an interest in real prop-
erty.) This analysis turns on the 
ownership of the mortgage notes.
The practices at Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc. (one of the nation’s 
largest loan originators in terms of 
volume during the boom and now 
part of Bank of America) illustrate 
the behavior of mortgage securitizers 
during that period of time. The court 
in In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 2010), documents in painful 
detail how Countrywide failed to 
transfer possession of a note to the 
pool backing a MBS, and thus failed 
to comply with the requirements 
necessary for that mortgage to com-
ply with the REMIC rules. Numerous 
other filings and reports suggest that 
Countrywide’s practices were typi-
cal of many major lenders during the 
early 2000s. A suit filed by the New 
York Attorney General also details in 
its allegations how loan originators 
and REMIC sponsors colluded to pop-
ulate REMICs with mortgages that 
inadvertently did not comply with 
the REMIC rules. See Complaint, New 
York v. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, No. 
451556/2012 (County of New York, 
Oct. 1, 2012). A suit filed on behalf 
of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae also 
alleges that the practices of loan orig-
inators have negative implications 
for the REMICs’ tax-advantaged sta-
tus. See Complaint, Federal Hous. Fin. 
Agency v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 
11 Civ. 6188 (DLC), 2012 WL 5395646 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011).
The practices of loan originators 
and REMIC sponsors have caused 
severe losses and have undermined 
the American property system. Sig-
nificant litigation has grown out of 
those losses. To date, hundreds of 
suits have been filed that allege a 
range of behaviors in the securitiza-
tion industry that have consequences 
for the REMIC rules. For reports on 
such litigation, see Bradley T. Borden 
& David J. Reiss, REFinBlog (Feb. 26, 
2013, 5:00 p.m.), http://refinblog.com. 
The resulting tax consequences for 
REMICs that failed to comply with 
the REMIC rules may be staggering.
Kemp addressed the issue of 
enforceability of a note under the 
Although Wall Street treated 
the REMIC rules with disregard, 
they are actually pretty 
straightforward in 
broad outline. 
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UCC for bankruptcy purposes. See 
440 B.R. at 626. The court in that case 
held that a note was unenforceable 
against the maker of the note and the 
maker’s property under New Jersey 
law on two grounds. The court held 
that because the beneficial owner of 
the note, the Bank of New York (the 
trustee of a pool of mortgages that 
backed an MBS that included the 
mortgage at issue in the case) did 
not have possession, and because 
the note lacked proper endorsement 
on sale, the note was unenforceable. 
Recognizing that the mortgage note 
came within the UCC definition of 
negotiable instrument, the court then 
considered who is entitled to enforce 
a negotiable instrument, but held that 
no such person was a party in Kemp.
The flaws in the opinion docu-
ments are shocking, even after the 
revelations regarding industry prac-
tices that have come to light since the 
subprime bust. These flaws include
•	 the originator failing to convey 
possession of the note to the 
intended assignee, the trustee of 
the pool;
•	 the originator failing to endorse 
the note to the intended 
assignee;
•	 the originator failing to affix an 
allonge to the note;
•	 the originator producing a Lost 
Note Certification in the same 
filing in which it claims to have 
located the original note;
•	 the originator transferring the 
note to the trustee only after the 
filing of the proof of claim; and
•	 the originator failing to main-
tain corporate formalities to 
distinguish it from its affiliates, 
as those formalities relate to the 
issue of possession of the note.
The consequences of these flaws play 
out for the borrower, the legal owner 
of the debt, and the trustee (the benefi-
cial owner) of the pool of mortgages 
securing the MBS, which includes the 
mortgage at issue in the case.
As the Kemp court notes:
From the maker’s standpoint, . . . 
it becomes essential to establish 
that the person who demands 
payment of a negotiable note, or 
to whom payment is made, is 
the duly qualified holder. Oth-
erwise, the obligor is exposed 
to the risk of double payment, 
or at least to the expense of lit-
igation incurred to prevent 
duplicative satisfaction of the 
instrument. These risks pro-
vide makers with a recognizable 
interest in demanding proof of 
the chain of title.
440 B.R. at 631 (quoting Adams v. 
Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d 
163, 168 (3d Cir. 1988)). Because the 
originator did not comply with the 
legal niceties, the beneficial owner of 
the debt, the trustee, cannot file its 
proof of claim, either.
The Kemp court did not address 
the third type of consequence (for the 
trustee) because it was not an issue 
before the court. Nonetheless, the anal-
ysis in Kemp illustrates how courts 
can reach results that undercut argu-
ments that REMICs were the owners 
of the mortgage notes and mortgages 
that were purportedly sold to them for 
REMIC rules purposes.
Even if the majority of jurisdictions 
issue foreclosure and bankruptcy 
rulings that have favorable conse-
quences for REMICs, the few with 
negative consequences can destroy 
the REMIC classification of many 
mortgage-backed securities that were 
structured to be—and promoted 
to investors as—REMICs. This is 
because rating agencies require that 
REMICs be geographically diversi-
fied to spread the risk of defaults 
caused by local economic conditions. 
Most, if not all, REMICs own mort-
gage notes and mortgages from states 
governed by laws that the courts may 
determine do not support REMIC 
eligibility for the mortgages from 
those jurisdictions. This diversifica-
tion requirement makes it very likely 
that REMICs will have more than a 
de minimis amount of mortgages that 
do not come within the definition of a 
qualified mortgage under the REMIC 
regulations. Professionals who helped 
structure these securitizations may 
face liability if the IRS were to find 
that a purported REMIC was just 
purported and not truly a REMIC.
Conclusion
As lawsuits arising from the housing 
boom allocate liability and damages 
arising from faulty securitizations 
among investors, underwriters, and 
securitization professionals, lawyers 
may feel no more empowered to take 
corrective action than homeowners 
do. Individual lawyers might feel as 
if they do not have much leverage 
over lenders, over title companies, or 
over Wall Street firms. And indeed, 
they do not. But as members of bar 
associations and trade associations, 
as informed constituents of elected 
officials, as wielders of the pen, they 
can attempt to influence policy and 
industry practices that they believe 
to be harmful to a well-ordered real 
estate market.
Looking back to the housing boom 
in the early 2000s, at the time some 
said that things could not keep going 
on like this. They were right, and the 
United States is now suffering the seri-
ous consequences. Let us now commit 
to speaking out in real time to reduce 
the chances that history repeats itself, 
at least in our lifetimes. n
The flaws in the opinion 
documents are shocking, 
even after the revelations 
regarding industry practices 
that have come to light since 
the subprime bust.
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Yes, the securitization boom left 
behind a mess. Yes, messes are bad. But 
there’s more to the discussion. The post-
securitization residential foreclosure 
mess should prompt larger questions 
about how we evidence, document, and 
transfer ownership of mortgage loans.
Does our system make any sense 
at all? Do the technical requirements 
that Borden and Reiss describe—now 
creating so much trouble for foreclo-
sures—still serve any purpose in the 
21st century? They certainly create 
tremendous paperwork, complexity, 
and legal issues, most of which seem 
entirely spurious and unnecessary.
They also create tremendous oppor-
tunities for error. As Borden and Reiss 
show, the mortgage origination and 
securitization industries seem to have 
fully seized all those opportunities. But 
do those troublesome technical require-
ments give anyone any protection that 
matters?
Yes, it’s certainly nice for a mortgage 
holder to be a holder in due course. But 
how often does holder-in-due-course 
status matter for today’s institutional 
residential mortgages? How often does 
the purchaser of such a loan actually 
benefit by taking free of defenses based 
on fraud or previous payment? How 
often has a loan purchaser been able 
to enforce against the borrower a pre-
viously repaid loan just because the 
purchaser was a holder in due course?
Today’s residential mortgages are 
so wrapped up with consumer protec-
tions that any holder of the loan would 
have trouble enforcing a mortgage loan 
that was truly subject to, for example, 
fraud in the inducement. As a practical 
matter, in the world of residential mort-
gages all defenses probably travel with 
the loan, so holder-in-due-course status 
has no real significance to a mortgage 
purchaser. It matters for checks and 
commercial transactions, but not for 
residential mortgages.
Borden and Reiss point out that 
 
traditional requirements for endorse-
ment and delivery of the original 
promissory note also protect the bor-
rower from the risk of having to pay the 
loan twice. While that risk may exist in 
theory, if the borrower had in fact paid 
the loan, that would typically provide a 
complete defense against foreclosure.
Any discussion that treats promis-
sory notes as a measure to mitigate the 
risk of double payment relies on the 
fantasy that when the borrower repays 
the loan, he will demand that the lender 
prove possession of the note and the 
right string of endorsements.
If any residential borrower actually 
asked to see the note at the time of pay-
off, the servicer’s first response would 
consist of confusion and laughter. 
When his laughter died down, the ser-
vicer would explain that the note was 
lost years ago. Or perhaps the servicer 
might advise the borrower to speak to 
someone else in some other department 
that never answers the phone. The bor-
rower would eventually give up.
Practically speaking, in today’s 
world, the main function of any original 
promissory note consists of getting lost.
If any mortgage borrower anywhere 
in the United States had ever actually 
needed to pay their mortgage loan a 
second time to keep their house, we 
would all have heard about it; even one 
instance would have prompted a tre-
mendous outcry. But has anyone ever 
heard of that actually happening?
Even if requirements for presenta-
tion of the note could prevent the risk of 
double payment, they wouldn’t achieve 
that goal, for two reasons. First, as men-
tioned, many notes get lost. Second, 
residential lenders often require the bor-
rower to sign multiple original notes. 
In other words, the requirement for a 
mortgage holder to show possession of 
the note doesn’t actually give the bor-
rower much protection.
Outside of real estate, many loans 
no longer require promissory notes, 
nor are they burdened by the technical 
requirements of the recording system 
or of negotiable instruments. No one 
cares about original notes, or holder in 
Letters to the Editor
Dirt Lawyers versus Wall Street: 
A Different View
In the securitization boom that preceded 
the financial crisis, people became 
sloppy about the technical details of 
transferring residential mortgages 
from the originator to intermediaries 
and ultimately to real estate mortgage 
investment conduit (REMIC) entities for 
securitization. Bradley T. Borden and 
David J. Reiss described the magnitude 
of the mess, and its possible legal, tax, 
and practical consequences, in the cover 
article of the May/June 2013 issue of 
this publication.
Notes were not properly endorsed. 
Lenders lost them. Assignments were 
never recorded, or were recorded in the 
wrong order or with gaps. Transfers 
that should have been made weren’t. 
Notes followed one path of transfers, 
mortgages another. When the music 
stopped, enforcement became a prob-
lem because servicers couldn’t figure 
out the paper trail. To fill gaps, those in 
the back room sometimes undertook a 
goal-oriented creative writing program.
Because of all that sloppiness, trans-
ferees of loans sometimes flunked the 
basic tests to become holders in due 
course. Borrowers faced the theoretical 
risk of having to pay their loans twice. 
REMICs maybe failed to qualify under 
the tax law, exposing their investors to 
tax disasters.
One might add that, as a result of 
all this, mortgage borrowers in default 
have had a field day delaying or even 
derailing foreclosures by claiming that 
the plaintiff lacked standing because it 
couldn’t prove ownership of the note 
and mortgage. And when loan servicers 
tried to clean up the files, borrowers 
cried fraud and robo-signing, while 
remaining in default.
Next time around, Borden and Reiss 
argue, we should do it right. Legal tech-
nicalities and niceties do matter. When 
we move mortgages, we should get 
the notes properly endorsed, the right 
assignments signed, and everything 
recorded both promptly and correctly.
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mortgage once, in favor of MERS, 
then any future mortgage assign-
ments could take place electronically, 
without the paperwork, pitfalls, 
delays, and variations—and now 
legal issues—entailed by generating 
and filing documents with thou-
sands of recording systems across the 
United States.
But the same antiquated legal 
notions that created so much trouble for 
mortgage assignments have also cre-
ated trouble for MERS. County clerks 
anxious to protect revenue, employ-
ment, and the importance of their 
offices joined forces with the foreclosure 
defense bar to try to derail the MERS 
train. Judges seized the opportunity 
MERS gave them to help defaulting 
borrowers stay in their homes, and to 
create new law—and to achieve good 
consumer protection headlines—in an 
area that suddenly assumed great pub-
lic importance. The result: a MERS mess 
with conflicting decisions from coast to 
coast, and many more months of bor-
rower defaults with impunity.
That doesn’t mean MERS was a bad 
idea. Our leaders should figure out 
how real estate law can accommodate 
and support MERS and move into the 
21st century. The idea of a single central 
registry for mortgage transfers makes 
sense. It would make even more sense 
to expand that central registry to cover 
all property-related transfers, replacing 
a system that often seems as outdated 
as quill pens and parchment.
Any proposal to blow up and re-
create our system of land records and 
mortgage loan assignments will face a 
predictable set of objections. Jobs will 
be lost, though other jobs created. Tax 
collectors might have trouble collecting 
taxes. The transition process won’t go 
perfectly. After the transition, real estate 
lawyers and paralegals will have less 
work to do. Will the system adequately 
protect and preserve online data? Will it 
invade privacy? And, of course, it might 
create new opportunities for fraud.
A better system for mortgage assign-
ments would also speed foreclosures. 
Would that be so bad? If a borrower 
can no longer afford his house and the 
market won’t let him sell for more than 
the mortgage balance, then he doesn’t 
really own the house anyway. The 
due course. Borrowers in those trans-
actions have not faced an epidemic 
of double payment claims. Purchas-
ers of these loans, or interests in them, 
haven’t suffered great losses for lack of 
an original piece of paper or holder-in-
due-course status.
Unlike mortgage assignments, 
corporate stock and other financial 
instruments are transferred electroni-
cally with little to no documentation. 
The transfer system itself keeps track 
of everything. If corporate stock trans-
fers followed the mortgage model, 
every corporation would have its own 
detailed set of rules, requirements, 
fees, filings, and forms for stock trans-
fer documentation. Every transfer of 
a single share of stock would require 
dealing with multiple pieces of paper 
with numerous signatures and could 
take weeks, with endless opportunities 
for problems and mistakes. Transfer-
ring 100 shares would require 100 sets 
of fully compliant documentation. But 
none of that happens, because the 
corporate stock transfer system is sim-
ple, functional, reliable, and largely 
electronic.
The 21st century is a great time to 
revisit the legal principles and practices 
that drive the complexity and paper-
work that led to the mistakes described 
by Borden and Reiss.
We could start by eliminating prom-
issory notes in mortgage transactions. 
Instead, we could document real estate 
loans as contractual promises in which 
possession of an original piece of paper 
has no particular significance. A prom-
issory note is not essential to evidencing 
an obligation to pay, secured or not. 
Ownership of a loan could be pre-
sumptively determined based on an 
institution’s books and records, and a 
history of loan payments.
We might even go a few steps further 
and establish a central registrar to keep 
track of who owns mortgage loans and 
who has the right to foreclose. Trans-
fers could be confirmed electronically, 
with no paperwork at all. A registrar’s 
certificate would evidence the right to 
foreclose.
The Mortgage Electronic Registra-
tion System (MERS) seemed like a great 
move in that direction. MERS contem-
plated that a lender would record its 
mortgage holder does, for all practical 
purposes. Every month the borrower 
has the option to keep the house by 
making that month’s payment. If 
he can’t make those payments, or 
chooses not to, that’s unfortunate, but 
he still doesn’t have any equity in the 
house. He should find a new place to 
live, just as millions of other Ameri-
cans do each year.
Foreclosures are part of any mort-
gage finance system, one possible 
outcome when someone borrows 
money and grants security. If we can’t 
stomach residential foreclosures, maybe 
the federal government should just buy 
everyone a house.
Commercial real estate is, of course, 
a different story. It is less fungible than 
houses. The roles of borrower and 
lender are more complex, nuanced, 
and interrelated. The identity of the 
borrower matters. And commercial 
foreclosures do not seem to have experi-
enced the same problems as residential 
foreclosures.
Aside from speeding up residential 
foreclosures, any attempt to fix loan 
transfers will also raise well-founded 
concerns that trying to change anything 
will just make it worse. But if we take a 
gradual and careful approach—perhaps 
moving state by state—to bringing our 
real estate documentation and security 
systems into the 21st century, then over 
time it should be possible to overcome 
these and other objections. The United 
States did something like that, though 
not as dramatic, when Revised Article 
9 became effective in 2001. Nothing too 
disastrous happened.
Some would argue that today’s sys-
tem protects mortgage borrowers by 
making it hard for mortgage lenders to 
spuriously enforce a mortgage loan that 
they don’t own or perhaps that isn’t 
even in default. Today’s system may do 
that. Aggressively applied by the courts, 
it puts mortgage lenders to the test and 
forces them to prove they own the loan 
they want to foreclose. When paper-
work deficiencies prevent the lender 
from proving standing, the lender gets 
thrown out of court.
In these cases, however, the borrower 
is still in default. And, realistically, lend-
ers don’t often try to foreclose on loans 
they don’t own or that aren’t in default. 
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When the court throws lenders out of 
court because of issues of standing, the 
defaulting borrower gets to keep her 
house, at least until the right paperwork 
gets lined up and submitted. In that 
time, as long as four years for a residen-
tial foreclosure proceeding in New York, 
the borrower typically doesn’t pay debt 
service, insurance, or real estate taxes. 
Once in a while the defaulting borrower 
gets really lucky: the paperwork is so 
bad that no one actually has the right to 
foreclose. 
All of this produces extraordinarily 
long, complex residential mortgage 
foreclosures, destabilizing neighbor-
hoods and preventing property values 
from recovering. When it isn’t clear 
who owns a property and no one has 
an incentive to maintain it, and noth-
ing about the foreclosure gets resolved 
quickly, the mortgage collateral inevi-
tably festers and deteriorates. Today’s 
clumsy system for documenting mort-
gage loan transfers puts properties 
into legal limbo for years as a result of 
paperwork requirements that might be 
quaint and funny if they didn’t create 
so much trouble.
Let’s assume, though, that a genuine 
risk exists that a mortgage lender might 
in fact try to foreclose a loan it doesn’t 
own against a borrower who isn’t in 
default. To address that risk, one could 
say that if a mortgage borrower ever 
lost his house under any such circum-
stances, he should be entitled to recover 
treble (or more) damages, plus attor-
ney’s fees, from the originator of his 
mortgage or whoever wrongfully took 
his house. The borrower would have 
the same right if she were forced to pay 
the same loan twice. Some state laws 
may already give borrowers rights like 
these; there, no change in law would be 
necessary at all.
With suitable safeguards, a stream-
lined system to track mortgage 
assignments would give borrowers 
ample protection.
In a separate discussion, Borden and 
Reiss also argue that technical glitches 
in transfers of mortgages may have 
caused many REMICs to fail the vari-
ous technical tests established under the 
Internal Revenue Code. The solution to 
that problem, if it really is one, would be 
much easier to adopt than other mea-
sures suggested earlier in this article.
 Solving the REMIC problem would 
require nothing more than a technical 
amendment to the Internal Revenue 
Code, which is, after all, entirely capa-
ble of being amended. The Code should 
say that as long as a REMIC directly or 
indirectly holds the risks and benefits 
of a mortgage loan, and cleans up any 
technical imperfections in its ownership 
within a reasonable time after learning 
of them, that should be just as good as if 
the REMIC actually owned the loan.
The apparent lack of publicized 
REMIC disqualifications to date may 
tell us that the IRS applies the REMIC 
requirements with the practicality and 
flexibility suggested in the previous 
paragraph. If that’s true, then perhaps 
nothing need be done.
The problems Borden and Reiss 
describe do definitely cry out for 
action—but not necessarily the action 
they suggest. Instead of exalting the 
technicalities of the current system, we 
should get rid of them. We should mas-
sively simplify loan transfers and revise 
the law as necessary to do that.
Joshua Stein
Joshua Stein PLLC
New York, New York
technical requirements give anyone 
any protection that matters.” Before 
going to the substance of the question, 
we would first ask, would Mr. Stein 
waive a strict notice requirement con-
tained in a commercial lease if doing so 
would harm his client? If not (and we 
are pretty sure it is “not”), why would 
a different rule apply with homeown-
ers? Certainly residential lenders don’t 
routinely waive “troublesome” require-
ments such as the one that requires 
monthly payments to be made by a cer-
tain date in order to avoid a late penalty.
As to the substance of Mr. Stein’s 
inquiry, we would answer—yes, tech-
nical requirements matter. As just one 
example, only certain parties can fore-
close on a mortgage. Technical state law 
requirements ensure that the plaintiff is 
one of those parties and protect borrow-
ers from defending actions by parties 
without standing to foreclose. Again, 
I am confident that Mr. Stein would 
insist on such a technical requirement if 
it were his commercial client who was 
faced with a foreclosure. What is good 
for the commercial goose is good for the 
residential gander as far as we can tell.
Another example: Stein’s dismissal 
of the relevance of the holder-in-due- 
course status in residential mortgage 
finance ignores the key role it played 
in the debate over state anti-preda-
tory lending legislation throughout 
the boom years in the early 2000s. See 
Before setting pen to paper to draft 
our response to Joshua Stein’s “Dif-
ferent View,” we had to look down to 
see whether the shoe was on the other 
foot. A preeminent real estate lawyer 
was criticizing two law professors for 
advocating for strict construction of 
documents and statutes and for think-
ing too small. And that practitioner 
was also advocating for a revolution in 
real estate finance, for sweeping away 
borrower protections that had been 
developed over a millennia under our 
common law system, and for replacing 
the status quo with an efficient sys-
tem designed by the financial industry, 
along the lines of the Mortgage Elec-
tronic Recording System (MERS). We 
expect to find that kind of thinking in 
law review articles!
Because our different approaches 
so clearly demonstrate the opposing 
views in the debate over the future 
of residential real estate finance, we 
will first review those differences and 
then highlight where they converge. In 
the end, we hope that real estate law-
yers of all stripes can come together 
with an approach to residential real 
estate finance that is efficient and also 
provides reasonable protections for 
homeowners.
Those Troublesome Technical 
Requirements!
Stein asks whether “those troublesome 
Dirty REMICs, Revisited
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loans and who has the right to fore-
close. As Stein acknowledges, this is a 
lot like the Mortgage Electronic Reg-
istration System (MERS). But Stein 
does not acknowledge any of the con-
troversy surrounding MERS, which 
was created by private interests such 
as Fannie, Freddie, and the Mortgage 
Bankers Association. They did not 
believe that they needed the approval 
of federal, state, or local governments, 
or anyone else for that matter, to dra-
matically change the recording system 
for mortgages. Things appeared to go 
swimmingly for a few years, but the 
shortcuts MERS took wrought a toll on 
it. Stein’s takeaway: do it again.
Our takeaway: if we do it again, let’s 
remember that process matters. Consult 
with all of the stakeholders, including 
those representing borrowers’ interests. 
Promote efficiency, but respect the body 
of law that has developed around mort-
gages. Accept that consumer protection 
is not only the right thing to promote 
but that consumer protection also pro-
motes responsible lending.
The Future of Residential 
Real Estate Finance
We have poked fun at Mr. Stein a bit 
for the double standard we believe he 
generally David Reiss, Subprime Stan-
dardization: How Rating Agencies Allow 
Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Sec-
ondary Mortgage Market, 33 Fla. St. U. L. 
Rev. 985 (2006).
And another: Stein argues that 
payment would “typically provide 
a complete defense against foreclo-
sure” in the case of a second foreclosure 
brought by the true owner of the debt. 
That misstates the real issue. The real 
issue is whether a borrower would 
have to defend an action to collect the 
debt brought by a true owner after 
another party brought a successful fore-
closure action. The clear answer is yes; 
they would need to pay for the defense 
of such a suit. And, in Arizona at least, 
they might be liable for that debt to 
the true owner under certain circum-
stances! See William K. Akina, David 
J. Reiss & Bradley T. Borden, Show Me 
the Note!, Westlaw J. Bank & Lender 
Liability 3 (June 3, 2013) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2274977 and http://
works.bepress.com/david_reiss/63).
And a last one: Stein argues that we 
are mistaken in calling for the IRS to 
enforce the REMIC rules as they are 
written so that the Treasury can collect 
revenue properly due to it by noncom-
pliant purported REMICs. The general 
tax enforcement policy is that if you do 
not comply with the strict requirements 
for avoiding taxation, you will pay tax 
on the transaction. We do not under-
stand why Stein would have a special 
rule for REMICs. It makes us wonder 
whether he believes that commercial 
real estate transactions should be gener-
ally exempt from strict compliance with 
the Internal Revenue Code. For instance, 
the period for identifying properties for 
like kind exchanges under IRC 
§ 1031 could be a few months instead 
of 45 days after the transfer of the relin-
quished property, and the exchange 
could happen 180 days, give or take, 
after that transfer. That would be very 
efficient for investors, too!
Law Professors Thinkin’ Small
Stein argues that we should sweep 
away a lot of the technical require-
ments relating to mortgages and adds 
that we might even go a few steps fur-
ther and establish a central registrar 
to keep track of who owns mortgage 
has for residential and commercial real 
estate finance transactions. But we are 
grateful that he has taken our argu-
ment seriously and agree with him that 
the stakes are high for borrowers and 
for the real estate finance industry. We 
agree that structural reform that would 
seek to modernize the system of resi-
dential real estate finance is called for. 
But until that reform is in place, we will 
continue to advocate for the enforce-
ment of procedural protections and for 
strong tax enforcement.
We would also emphasize that a 
thoughtful process for adopting pro-
posed reforms is not only important to 
ensure that all stakeholders are repre-
sented but also to ensure the long-term 
legitimacy of the new system. And we 
cannot emphasize enough how impor-
tant we believe consumer protection 
is to a well-functioning residential real 
estate finance system. A thousand years 
of precedents in law and equity back us 
up on that.
Bradley T. Borden
David Reiss
Brooklyn Law School
Brooklyn, New York
2013 RPTE Law Student 
Writing Contest Winners
Congratulations to the 2013 Law Student Writing Contest winners:
First place—Jessica Beess und Chrostin of Harvard Law School: “Mandatory 
Arbitration Clauses in Donative Instruments: A Taxonomy of Disputes and Type-
Differentiated Analysis.”
Second place—Rebecca Gross of Georgetown University Law School: “Intestate 
Intent: Presumed Will Theory, Duty Theory, and the Flaw of Relying on Average 
Decedent Intent.”
Third place—Kyle Belz of Stetson University College of Law: “No Covenant for 
Old Men: Restrictive Covenants’ Impact on Aging in Place.”
The goal of the RPTE student writing contest is to encourage and reward law 
student writing on the subjects of real property or trust and estate law. The essay 
contest is designed to attract students to these law specialties and to encourage 
scholarship and interest in these areas. Articles submitted for judging are encour-
aged to be on timely topics and have not been previously published.
Jessica Beess und Chrostin, the first place winner, will receive $2,500 cash, a 
one-year free membership in the Section, and free round-trip airfare and weekend 
accommodations to attend the Section’s Fall Leadership Meeting, November 7–9, 
2013, in New Orleans (valued at approximately $1,000). In addition, Jessica’s essay 
will be considered for publication in a future issue of the Real Property, Trust and 
Estate Law Journal. Rebecca Gross, the second place winner, will receive $1,500 cash, 
and Kyle Belz, the third place winner, will receive $1,000 cash.
